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ON THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF PARENTS
Carl E. Schneider*

HE law of the family is the law of the absurd. Law is a system of
T
rules administered institutionally, and thus it must treat people categorically. When law regulates economic life, it finds people at arguably
their most schematic, motivated-perhaps-by a relatively unitary conception of their interest pursued in relatively rational ways. But in family
life, people are at their least schematic and at their most frustratingly
human, various, idiosyncratic, irrational, and perverse, and the law's
efforts to affect them are thus often quixotic. In Parents as Fiduciaries, 1
Professor Scott and Dean Scott strikingly and boldly deploy the conceptual vocabulary of the former kind of law to reinterpret the latter kind.
The result-contrary to what one might expect given the awkwardness
of the problem, but just as one might expect given the distinction of the
authors-is an exceptionally engaging and provocative essay in the best
tradition of legal scholarship. It is fair-minded, judicious, and sensible. It
· is a sober and steadying contribution to a flighty and faddish field, yet it is
creative. It is doctrinally based, informed, and perceptive, yet it is also a
large survey of causes. And in its crucial aspects, it is animated by the
most needed kind of moral insights.
Indeed, so absorbing have I found this article that I have abandoned
my original plan to go off on a frolic of my own and have instead devoted
this Commentary to examining it in some depth and detail. In a way,
though, I have found this enterprise difficult, since I agree with so much
of what the Scotts have set out to do. I hope, then, that my remarks may
be accepted as a friendly amendment, amplifying a bit here, raising some
questions there, and finally speculating about what efforts like the Scotts'
portend for legal scholarship.
I take the Scotts' article to be a response to recent criticism of the law
of parent and child. One branch of this criticism (which has recently been
intensified in the press by cases like those of Jessica DeBoer) might be

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Readers of some of my earlier articles may
wonder at the archaic citation forms used in this Comment. Let me therefore say for the
record that, for the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1343 (1986), I followed the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation
(1989) in writing this piece.
1 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401
(1995).
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called the child-advocate's critique. Simply put, the gist of this view is
that the law advantages parents at the expense of their children. Another
branch of this criticism has been particularly concerned with the consequences of rights discourse for the law of parent and child specifically and
for American social relations generally. This branch might be called the
communitarian's critique.
·
The Scotts' response to this two-tined criticism is that the law of parent
and child needs to be "reconceptualized" in terms of the fiduciary principle more familiar to us from the law of agency. The central mechanism
of their article, then, is to take a concept from the law of agency and
apply it to the law of the family. This mechanism, like any such borrowing, raises a set of initial, basic questions: How is family law to understand
the borrowed concept? Is that concept to be imported bodily as a rule?
As a guiding principle? On this score, I am not entirely confident I
understand the Scotts' proposal. They refer to the fiduciary idea variously as a "metaphor," an "analogy," and a "heuristic." These terms all
appear to imply that the borrowed concept is not to be powerfully directive. But how directive then should it be, and how useful can it be if its
teachings are not fairly emphatic?
We may see the importance of that question more clearly when we consider the next question the device of borrowing raises: To whom is the
proposal made? Who is to receive and apply the new concept? Are we
trying to affect, for instance, parental behavior, judicial actions, or scholarly thinking? Much of the article is (quite properly) concerned with how
the public in general and parents in particular understand the concepts
and language of the law. Thus the Scotts seek to discover the means
through which a legal regulation can best motivate parents to invest the
effort necessary to fulfill the obligations of child-rearing? Is the borrowed doctrine, then, directed at that audience? Is it, in other words,
intended to divert parents' attention away from the prerogatives of their
rights toward the welfare of their children?
This explanation seems unlikely, since one may doubt that the general
public knows the· meaning of a term (fiduciary) even many law students
ouly vaguely understand. Is the audience for the fiduciary proposal then
the judiciary? Should courts expressly adopt, or at least implicitly consult, the doctrine of fiduciary obligation? This is surely a more promising
proposition, since judges presumably are well acquainted with that doctrine. On the other hand, the language the Scotts use to describe their
proposal..:...._"metaphor," "analogy," "heuristic device"-does not evoke

2
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the kind of concept that could be easily parsed and promulgated
judicially.
This kind of language does, however, seem aptly pitched for the academic ear. But whether the concept is intended for judges or scholars (or
both), our next question will be the same: How much weight can the fiduciary principle bear? How much guidance can it give us?
The advantage of borrowing a concept from another area of law is the
advantage of buying asparagus from the grocer instead of growing it
yourself. Both the concept and the asparagus come ready to use; someone else has done all the work of developing the product. The danger in
both cases is that the product may not be apt for your purposes. The
asparagus might be fine for long boiling, but too old, tired, tough, and
woody for the light steaming your more delicate dish demands. The concept may be well-suited to its original home, but not to the new area of
law.
As the Scotts describe it, the law of fiduciary obligation is a protean
doctrine which assumes different forms depending on the relationships
involved. And none of the relationships to which it ordinarily applies
much resembles the situation of parent and child. Indeed, the Scotts
scrupulously chart a number of ways in which fiduciary and parent-child
relationships differ significantly. For example, they note that a new fiduciary can generally be substituted for an old one without intolerable disruption, while parents are not so readily replaced. 3 The Scotts also
suggest that it can be harder to gauge whether parents have acted in their
child's interest than whether corporate directors have made a decision
within the range of acceptable business practices.4 These and other differences between the parent's situation and the fiduciary's raise the question I posed at the beginning of this Commentary: whether commercial
law is generally suited for an arena so different from family life as to
make borrowing from it problematic for family law.
Despite the differences between the situations of the fiduciary and the
parent, fiduciary law might well have worked out concrete instantiations
of its general principle, and the legal doctrines thus developed might well
speak cogently to particular problems in family law. This is not, however,
the direction the Scotts go. They rarely mention specific rules of fiduciary
law. And in the main exception to this generalization-their discussion
of the prohibition on self-dealing-the Scotts convincingly show why
fiduciary law cannot readily be applied to family law.5 Thus it seems that,
3
4
5

Id. at 2428, 2430.
Id. at 2437-41.
ld.
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as developed legal doctrine, fiduciary law does not brightly illuminate
many of the dark dilemmas of family law.
Perhaps, then, the benefit of recruiting fiduciary law into family law is
that the former incorporates general principles the latter lacks but needs.
This does seem to be much closer to what the Scotts have in mind. They
argue that fiduciary law distinguishes itself among legal fields as instinct
with a sense of moral obligation and that introducing fiduciary law into
family law would therefore promote a sense of moral obligation to
greater prominence in the eyes of courts and parents.
I confess that my interest in this line of reasoning grows out of an article I wrote a decade ago in which I argued that the law·has decreasingly
discussed family issues in moral terms. 6 The Scotts' article appears to be
part of what may be a trend which bespeaks some unease about that tendency. This trend-if such it be-comprises just the strange bedfellows
politics is said to make, for to it contribute, in their various ways, feminists and conservatives, scholars and politicians, the press and the public.
That trend has perhaps been most apparent in discussions of child support. But, as the works the Scotts cite suggest,7 its scope is altogether
broader. While the ultimate nature, strength, and permanence of this
movement are yet uncertain, I believe it has sparked a rewarding examination of the tendency away from moral discourse in family law.
Nevertheless, I wonder whether fiduciary principles may not be problematic as a general statement of what parents should do for their children. In its original, pure form, the fiduciary principle appears to require
fiduciaries to put their loyalty to the benefited person's interest above all
else. A& the famous (and inevitable) passage from Cardozo puts it,
"Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
But the
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty .... " 8
interests of children probably should not invariably trump the interests of
parents. The Scotts acknowledge this, and remind us that we do not
expect parents always to sacrifice themselves to serve their children.9
Courts acknowledge this-too when, for example, they make a custodian's
wealth irrelevant in child-custody proceedings. Other things being equal
(and probably even if some things aren't equal),- most children would
6 Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discpurse and the Transfonnation of American Family Law,
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985). I continued my exploration of this theme in Rethinking
Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 197; The
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 495 (1992); and Marriage, Morals,
and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 503.
7 Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2413 n.44.
s Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
9 Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2413-14, 2432, 2432.
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probably prefer to live in a well-to-do household than a poor one. In a
capitalist society, this is sensible enough. As John Rawls reminds us,
money is a primary good, something "it is supposed a rational man wants
whatever else he wants .... With more of these goods men can generally
be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in
advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be." 10 We exclude this
otherwise relevant consideration, I suppose, out of an unarticulated sense
of fairness to the adults who are candidates for custody. But exclude it
we do.
In short, in one sense the fiduciary standard seems higher than the
standard we might expect from parents. This is because the fiduciary's
relationship with the benefitted party is commonly of limited scope, while
the relationship between parent and child involves broad swaths of both
of their lives. It may be practical to impose a high standard of selflessness
within a limited strip of a person's life; it is less practical to do so more
globally.
The Scotts are well aware of this kind of problem with applying the
fiduciary standard to parents. And they also understand that the state's
limited enforcement powers and the family's need for privacy tightly constrict what the law can demand of parents. 11 But by the time the Scotts
have taken all these limitations into account, the standard the fiduciary
principle demands of parents seems rather modest. In short, there winds
up being so little moral meat left in the stew that it begins to look almost
vegetarian.
This problem becomes clearer when we look at what the law (and, as I
understand them, the Scotts) actually ask of parents. Essentially, the law
only intervenes in an intact family when parents have drastically
affronted the most modest kinds of standards, when they have abused or
neglected their children. Even parents who have abused or neglected
their children are basically held only to the law's minimal standards of
parental decency. And when the law deals with divorced parents, it effectively asks little more than that they pay what they owe. The law would
deny unmarried fathers parental standing only when they have in some
useful sense abandoned their children. In child-custody disputes, parents
are not judged by any objective standard, but are only compared with
each other. In all these cases, the fiduciary principle in its aspirational
form is irrelevantly high, and in its applied form incongruously low.
I say "incongruously low" because the gravamen of the fiduciary principle is presumably to inspire an elevated standard of moral conduct in
to John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 92 (1971).
u Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2430-31.
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parents: "By establishing a standard of performance that emphasizes
heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use of hortatory moral rhetoric, the law invokes a personal sense o(moral obligation
in the performance of fiduciary duty." 12 But the fiduciary principle as
applied to parents is much, much weaker than the standard of moral
behavior socially applied to parents. In American culture, a mother or a
father's obligation to a child is potentially greater than virtually any other
kind of obligation one person can pledge to another. The fiduciary obligation, so often essentially commercial, is of a weaker sort. The fiduciary
standard is "loyalty and reasonable diligence." 13 The parental standard is
altruism.
In sum, it is hard to get concrete and convincing guidance about what
the fiduciary principle means for family law from the general moral principle it is usually taken to embody. Thus we are relegated to a hypothetical bargain the .Scotts posit as the source of our understanding of that
meaning. How far can such a bargain take us?
The device of the hypothetical bargain has an illustrious history in both
law and philosophy. That history teaches that the usefulness of the device
depends on how richly and accurately the original position of the parties
is gauged. Professor Scott has set a high standard for using this kind of
device in her influential article Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage
and Divorce .14 There she suggested that couples contemplating marriage
might wish to bind themselves to each other more firmly by using
"precommitments." However, the bargaining that might lead to such
precommitments was in a sense real bargaining involving people in quite
a specific and realistic situation. Professor Scott was able to make their
situation yet more specific and realistic by adducing the relevant social
science literatures about couples' preferences.
In contrast, the bargain envisioned here is e.ntirely and genuinely hypothetical. It involves an almost undifferentiated mass of people in a quite
imaginary negotiation. Thus assigning the parties powers, interests, and
arguments becomes an awkward task. Consider, for example, the bargaining power assigned the state. In the paper they presented at the conference, the Scotts stated in explicit terms the assumption which survives .
in the current version: that "rearing children in a family unit is subject to
state approval." 15 This is rather daring. It conflicts with our feeling that
Id. at 2425.
Id. at 2402.
14 Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 9 (1990).
15 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, Paper Presented at the
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics and VIrginia Law Review Conference on
12
13
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the family is in important senses prior to the state. It also conflicts with
the reality that the state cannot effectively prevent people from raising
their own children (because it lacks the resources and skill to raise them
itself).
Nor is it clear that the Scotts' assumptions about the interests of the
parties are completely described. We are told that "the overarching purpose of the state is to protect the interests of children in receiving from
their parents the care and nurture necessary to enable them to develop
into healthy adults." 16 But doesn't the state have other interests? What
about the cost of that project? And doesn't the state have an interest in
promoting even the parents' interests?
We may ask similar questions of the motive assigned to the parents,
which is "to maximize the returns from parenthood.'m Might the parents
not want to minimize the burdens of parenthood? Might the parents
want to be able to slip the bonds of parenthood where the costs seemed
to exceed the benefits? Might they simply want to maximize their happiness, of which the returns of parenthood would only be one part? Many
parents might simply want to be left alone. Such parents might have
views-for instance, opinions about disciplining children-that would
violate even the minimalist rules the law presently embodies. Other parents would value their privacy intensely. In short, what prospective parents would really say would greatly depend on their own understanding
of their own situation, and such understandings would differ a good deal.
The Scotts obviously know how much parents differ. Why do they not
take those differences more fully into account? We may get a hint from
their occasional use of the term "precommitments.'' What the Scotts do
not say in terms but seem to be arguing is that parents might recognize
that the ideals with which they enter parenthood can be lost in the shuffle, and that therefore parents might want the state to hold them to those
ideals. But would parents really think this way? For example, parents
with heterodox religious views might regard the chances of falling short
of their ideals as rather low, and the dangers of state intervention as
rather great, and thus prefer no intervention. Other parents might prefer
other kinds of precommitment devices in which the state did not play
such a regulatory role.
"New Directions in Family Law" 39 (March 3-4, 1995) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association). This implicit premise survives in the final Article, as the Scotts
presume that ·'in rearing children parents must fulfill the fundamental objective of the
state: to provide the care and nurture necessary for children to develop as healthy,
functioning adults." Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2432.
16 Id. at 2431.
17 Id. at 2432.
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To rescue the hypothetical bargain from the many ways differently situated parents could conceive of their interests, we might say that we are
assuming purely hypothetical parents, so that they are blinded by the veil
of ignorance Jolm Rawls imagines. But this raises exactly the kinds of
problems traditionally directed at Rawl~' version of the hypothetical bargain. These problems are intensified by the fact that we are not imagining an entire society de novo, but rather trying to decide how to regulate
real families in a present society with a long history. Further, I am
inclined to think that, once the bargainers become so abstracted from real
people in real situations, it is possible to imagine them taking many positions, all reasonable, but not all identical. To get them to agree, if you
could do so at all, you would have to formulate your principles so broadly
and vaguely that they would offer little guidance. In short, can the hypothetical bargain be determinate enough to provide useful guidance?
Furthermore, something may be lost by not confronting the problem of
social regulation more directly. The hypothetical bargaining device
seems, for instance, to assume that the state and parents agree enough
about essentials to reach agreement on them. This may be true, but I am
skeptical. I wonder whether it might be franker and more realistic to say
that the state imposes rules in order to prevent parents from harming
their children, not because they and the state have reached some kind of
hypothetical contract. The state presumably would argue, as the Scotts
do, that its rules are right and that parents therefore should want them.
But the rules were adopted because they were right, and not because the
parties would have agreed to them.
I have asked what kind of guidance the fiduciary prinCiple can give
family law. I have examined each source of guidance that principle might
offer, and I have raised the possibility that each is in important ways mute
or garbled. Ultimately, then, Parents as Fiduciaries may be not so much a
demonstration that the fiduciary principle should be borrowed for family
law, but an argument that the parents' rights principle has come to be
misunderstood and that properly understood it incorporates a concern for
children's welfare. As the Scotts write, "The central insight of the fiduciary heuristic is to focus attention on the reciprocal relationship between
· parental rights and children's interests."18
I quite agree with the Scotts that the parental-rights doctrine may be
conceived of as a rule intended to serve children's interests. And I
believe the Scotts perform an estimable service in reminding us of this
fundamental assumption. Parents' rights have commonly been assumed
to protect children exactly becau~e people have thought that, as a rule,
18

Id. at 2474.
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parents and children have a community of interest and that parents thus
have a duty and ability to speak for their children, children who are presumptively unable _to speak for themselves.
These assumptions find a variety of expressions. In our family law
casebook, for instance, Margaret Brinig and I suggest eight justifications
for assigning parents rights. 19 First, parents ordinarily know their child
and their child's situation better than anyone else can, since they have
cared for and lived with their child in the most complete kind of way from
its birth, and since no governmental agency is well situated to acquire
equally good information. Second, decisions about children implicate
questions about the dynamics of child development and of family interactions about which many judges and }?ureaucrats are not particularly
expert. (Parents may be no more expert, but at least the state will often
be unable to assert superior insight to override the parents' judgment.)
Third, the situations in which children live are so various, complex, and
unpredictable that no adequately comprehensive, detailed, and principled
set of standards could be drawn up that would satisfactorily guide courts
or agencies in making decisions about children. Furthermore, in a large
pluralistic society it is hard to reach a satisfactory social agreement about
what kind of adults we want children to become, about what child-rearing
methods will produce what kind of adults, or about what child-rearing
methods are otherwise appropriate. And yet further, some kinds of considerations-like religious belief or ethnic tradition-may be desirable in
rearing children but illegitimate for the state to employ. Fmally, at least
some decisions about children ought not obey the impersonal standards
the law must use, but should heed the standards of accommodation, affection, and love which parents commonly feel for their children.
The fourth justification for parental rights has to do with the enforcement problem. Much of the interaction between parents and children
occurs in private, and government therefore cannot easily find out about
it or supervise it. Much that influences parents involves psychological
motives which are both strong and ill perceived and which thus are so
imperative that even governmental sanctions may be vain. Furthermore,
parents will often feel that their upbringing of their children is not the
concern of outsiders (and particularly not any of the government's business), so that parents will resist attempts to enforce government's rules
and decisions. And finally, governmental attempts to enforce rules or
decisions against parents may provoke them to retaliate against the very
people the government is trying to protect-the children.
19 Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law (1996). We
discuss these questions in Chapter 8.
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Fifth, governmental intervention, by bringing into the family outsiders
from social workers to prosecutors,, may disrupt the stability of the relationship between parent and child. As Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, for
example, put the point, one justification for parental rights is that children need stable authority figures and that governmental intervention in
the family injures parents in that role.20 Sixth, and relatedly, state inquiry
into the world of parent and child may injure parents and children by
diminishing the privacy of both in ways that do genuine harm.
Notably, these first six rationales for parental rights are based on the
belief that giving parents power is good for children. These rationales are
pragmatic and prudential. They are essentially generalizations which reason that the state will ordinarily raise children less successfully than parents and so should presumptively be excluded from doing so.
These six prudential justifications do not, however, exhaust our list of
reasons to attribute rights to parents. While the six say little about the
interests of parents, the seventh draws on the principle that it is normatively preferable for people to organize their own lives, particularly their
own intimate lives. Thus our seventh justification for parental rights is
that parents should be able to organize their relationship with their children. This justification might be inadequate by itself, and it should be
read in conjunction with the other justifications. Nevertheless, it does
look at parents' interests in their relationship with their children, and thus
I believe captures an integral part of American thinking about this subject perhaps more directly than the Scotts seem to allow.
But the children's interests and the parents' interests do not exhaust
our justifications for parental rights. Our eighth justification h~s ,to do
with what might be considered the state's interests: Allowing parents
freedom to raise their children as they prefer allows parents to perpetuate
whatever communities, orthodox or heterodox, the parents prefer,
thereby helping to preserve the range of communities necessary to make
pluralism meaningful. Pluralism as Americans have commouly understood it depends on the persistence of cultural communities, and that persistence is most likely where parents may- raise children in a cultural
heritage. If the state would pro~ote a pluralist society, it can usefully
recognize parents' rights. Thus like the seventh argument for parents
rights, the eighth extends beyond the state's interest in seeing children
well reared.
As I said at the beginning of this piece, the present wave of family law
reform holds' that ~arents' interests have been exalted over children's.
20 See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child 7 (1973).
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Ironically, the preceding wave used the kind of reasoning the Scotts and
Brinig and I instantiate to argue that parents' rights may serve children's
welfare. In two influential articles, for instance, Michael Wald advocated
stricter adherence to parental rights.Z1 He contended that the state was
too willing to separate children from their parents and to place them in
unsatisfactory foster homes, and he wanted to temper that willinguess
through a strategy of parents' rights.
If the parents' rights principle is substantially based on the child's interests, as the Scotts and I contend, why is it presently criticized as inimical
to children's interests? Let me suggest two among the several possible
causes. The first has to do with the nature of American rights discourse.
As the Scotts note, the rhetoric of rights has a force of its own both in
legal and popular culture, a force which can drive parents, officials, and
judges to an enthusiasm for parents' rights that quite outstrips the rationale for them. In addition, our rights language sadly lacks an adequate
vocabulary for expressing countervailing interests. In technical terms,
constitutional rights-analysis has generally scanted the state interests that
may conflict with the parent's right.22 Thus the prudential origins of
parental rights are all too easily forgotten. To put the point somewhat
differently, parents' rights can be so unyielding that the only thing powerful enough to blast them loose is a countervailing right, like children's
rights.
A second cause of the present discontent has to do, I think, with the
fact that any legal regime governing the relations of parent and child will
inevitably produce some deplorable cases. Any such regime must rely on
some combination of rules and discretion, and both rules and discretion
regularly fail. Discretion may be abused, and the people to whom discretion is confided will sometimes err. Rules are a kind of generalization,
and all generalizations are false. Error is thus inevitable. Unhappily, we
too easily respond to error by assuming that our grant of discretion was
improvident or that our rule is unwise. Our rule has been parents' rights,
and it has produced its errors. We now seek to prevent such errors from
arising in the future by instituting a new rule-children's rights. Yet this

21 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985 (1975); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976).
22 I develop this argument at some length in State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth
Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Winter 1988, at 79.
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rule will ineluctably cause errors (possibly more numerous and more distressing) of its own.
Ultimately, I doubt there really is much disagreement about the broad
goal of legal policy regarding children. At base, rather, there is a consensus about the centrality of children's well-being, at least within the rather
narrow ambit of the law's capacity. The question is just how you reach
that goal. I am not even sure how much genuine difference there is
among the controversialists. Indeed, as I have been implying, the presumably conflicting tests tend to collapse into each other. The Scotts, for
instance, say that the law should focus "principally on the relationship
between parent and child, rather than on the child's needs per se."23 But
an important part of what the child needs is a good relationship with its
parents, and that relationship partly depends on the child's needs being
met Parents' rights take children's claims into account. Children's interests depend on good relations with their parents.
The Scotts recognize ..how interrelated the contending rules are.
Indeed, their article could be taken as an effort to show how readily those
rules can be reconciled. However, the Scotts continue to feel that the
choice among the rules matters. 24 And this brings me to my last point.
As I have argued, the debate to which the Scotts have so ably contributed
is largely about what rule we need to write to produce good results. I
have suggested that there is rough social agreement about what a good
result is. There is, however, real disagreement about how to produce it.
To resolve that disagreement, we need to ask the right questions: How do
courts and agencies interpret the various possible rules? How would the
rules thus interpreted actually affect the behavior of courts and of agencies? And what effect would that behavior have on the short- and longterm well-being of children and their parents?
These crucial questions cannot be answered by doctrinal analysis, however acute, nor by theoretical argument, however keen. They are questions that demand empirical investigation. To be sure, such empirical
work must be informed by other kinds of scholarship. To be sure, such
empirical work will rely on normative assumptions and have normative
consequences. But everything depends on that empirical work.
I am on record in favor of scholarship that undertakes the labor of
definition, generalization, and theory in family law.25 Family law has
moved markedly in that direction in the decade since I wrote that article
Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 2415.
Id. at 2416-18.
-25 Carl E. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in
American Family Law, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1039 (1985).
23

24
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(although not, I am sure, because of it). My own work in family law has
irredeemably been in that vein. I continue to think theoretical work
essential to legal scholarship. But I am increasingly inclined to believe
that such work is idle without an extensive empirical foundation and
without exhaustive empirical monitoring.
Nevertheless, family law scholars have not, I think, been eager to do
that kind of work.26 This is understandable. Empirical research can be
difficult. It is often time-consuming. At its most satisfying, it may .be
prohibitively expensive. It can require skills lawyers may lack. It is not
always properly rewarded: Law review students commonly underestimate its importance; faculty sadly and foolishly tend to regard only theoretical work as worthy of a great mind. In my darker moments, I see a
danger that theory may drive out empiricism, that family law scholarship
may skip from the doctrinal to the doctrinaire without ever pausing for
the empirical.
Yet the case for such work almost makes itself. In brief: "It is no doubt
true that you caunot get from is to ought. But you ought to know what is
is before you say what ought ought to be."27 We need empiricism to ward
off hyper-rationalism. "Hyper-rationalism is essentially the substitution
of reason for information and analysis. It. has two components: first, the
belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is
unavailable or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts
through a [narrow] set of artificial analytic categories."28 Hyper-rationalism thus "tempts us to believe that we can understand how people think
and act merely by reasoning, and not by investigating. Hyper-rationalism
seductively justifies discussing human behavior without doing the empirical work necessary to discover how people actually behave. Hyperrationalism is the conceptualist's revenge for the world's complexity."29
The legally trained mind seems specially susceptible to hyper-rationalism. The case method intrudes empirical reality only anecdotally; rights
thinking prefers the lofty heights of ratiocination. But when legal scholarship has ventured to ask empirically whether law works as it is intended
to, and even whether it has much effect at all, the answers have hardly
been reassuring. Stewart Macaulay reports that businesses widely do not
26 I must stress that I am not exempting myself from these criticisms. If anything, I have
exacerbated the problem by incitement and example. My only plea in mitigation can be
that I am now doing empirical work in the field of Jaw and medicine. And I have found it
valuable (and absorbingly interesting).
27 Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 Ind. L.J. 1075, 1077 (1994).
28 Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: WISdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy,
84 Mich. L. Rev. 919, 932 (1986).
29 Schneider, supra note 27, at 1078.
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think of themselves as using contracts and avoid settling disputes contractually.30 Robert Ellickson finds that the ranchers and farmers of Shasta
County, California, do not know the rules of liability for damage done by
wandering cattle, and do not much care.31 Despite the Patient SelfDetermination Act and much state legislation, "[n]o more than 10 percent of the population has either a living will or a durable power of attorney."32 I could go on at some length.
When good empirical work has been done in family law, it has been
revealing and even confounding. Among the generation of family law
scholars most prominent when I entered the field, for example, there are
several who have done crucial empirical work (as well as noteworthy theoretical work). Robert Mnookin, for example, discovered in his empirical
work that not an his theoretical speculations about divorce negotiations
were fully borne- out.33 David Chambers perhaps found that jail,
whatever its other disadvantages, was a more effective tool for collecting
child support than he might originally have supposed.34 The co~tributors
to In, the Interest of Children 35 learned that people avail themselves of
due process mechanisms a good deal less than courts and scholars comfortably contemplate.36
More particularly, Michael Wald, a principal proponent of stronger
parents' rights in abuse-and-neglect law, examined that law's actual
effects.37 His work raised the possibility that the rules of law we have
been considering may matter less than one might suppose a priori. He
concluded that, considering only "what happened to the children from
the time we first saw them until the end of the study, two years later,
there was not a great deal of difference between home and foster care."38
In short, such research establishes that the legal prhlciples the Scotts, and
30 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963).
31 Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
32 Arthur L. Caplan, Can Autonomy be Saved?, in If I Were a Rich Man Could I Buy a
Pancreas? and Other Essays on the Ethics of Health Care 256, 261 (1992).
33 Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal
Dilemmas of Custody (1992).
34 David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support (1979).
35 Robert H. Mnookin, Robert A Burt, David L. Chambers, Michael S. Wald, Stephen
D. Sugarman, Franklin E. Zimring & Rayman L. Solomon, In the Interest of Children:
Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy (1985).
36 Id. For an amplification of my point about this study, see my review of it: Carl E.
Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 919 (1986).
37 Michael S. Wald, J.M. Carlsmith & P.H. Leiderman, Protecting Abused and
Neglected Children (1988).
38 Id. at 183.
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I, and others have considered at such length may not lead to consequential changes in outcomes.
In sum, Parents as Fiduciaries is an admirable work of legal scholarship.
But it is not part of the genre of work I have come to believe is most
likely to contribute to real progress in our understanding of the kinds of
issues it raises. It is exactly because this article is so fine that this Comment is a suitable vehicle for what I want to say about legal scholarship.
If even so skillful, thoughtful, and wise a piece cannot be expected, and
indeed does not intend, to penetrate to the key questions we need to ask
about how the law in this area works, then we need to consider how to
change the agenda of family law scholarship.39

39 I am also emboldened to make my perhaps impertinent suggestions about empirical
work in the context of commenting on the Scotts' article because Professor Scott is herself
distinguished for bringing empirical learning to bear on family law. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455 (1984); Scott,
supra note 14; Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking,
37 Viii. L. Rev. 1607 (1992).

